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JURISDICTIONAL ATTACHMENT OF LIABILITY INSURANCE
IN LIGHT OF THE CHANGING DUE PROCESS CONCEPTS OF
SHAFFER v. HEITNER
INTRODUCTION

In 1966 the field of state court jurisdiction was swept by controversy in
'
the wake of the New York Court of Appeals decision in Seider v. Roth sustaining quasi in rem jurisdiction on the basis of an attachment of liability
insurance. The case, flowing from a formalistic application of traditional
2
notions of presence derived from Pennoyer v. Neff, upheld jurisdiction on
the fictional premise that an insurance policy constituted property situated
in the forum state. In its original formulation, adjudicatory authority over
property had provided a counterweight to the restrictive consequences of
requiring defendants to be physically present in order to be subject to personal jurisdiction. However, after in personam jurisdiction was expanded
in International Shoe Co. v. Washington2 to allow suit against absent defendants on the basis of a reasonableness standard, the continued utilization
of quasi in rem jurisdiction began to appear increasingly anachronistic. The
anomaly of permitting quasi in rem actions based solely on the presence
of property was particularly apparent when considering insurance and other
intangibles which could only have a fictional situs. Seider epitomized this
anomaly.
Because liability insurance was viewed as a debt which was fictionally
present wherever the insurer was doing business, jurisdiction based on attachment of this debt made possible suits against defendants who had no
connection with the forum state. Subsequent case law sensitive to this potential unfairness sought to place restrictions on jurisdictional attachment of
insurance and to justify the procedure in terms of a reasonableness standard.
Nonetheless, Seider proceedings continued to be upheld on the ground that
quasi in rem jurisdiction was proper whenever the defendant's property
was present in the forum state.
Recently, however, jurisdictional attachment of insurance has been called
4
into question by the Supreme Court's holding in Shaffer v. Heitner requiring both quasi in rem and in personam jurisdiction to meet the International Shoe test of fair play and substantial justice. This note will examine
the evolution of quasi in rein jurisdiction based on insurance and will analyze
its future viability in light of Shaffer's pronouncement that all assertions of
adjudicatory authority must meet the same test of reasonableness. Whether
quasi in rein jurisdiction based on liability insurance meets the unified
standards mandated by Shaffer is dependent upon the interpretation given
these standards. Under a substantial fairness test, an argument can be made
that in light of all the facts and circumstances, jurisdictional attachment
1.
2.
3.
4.

17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
95 U.S. 714 (1877).
326 U.S. 810 (1945).
433 U.S. 186 (1977).
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of insurance will continue to be viable since the insurer rather than the
defendant pays the cost of the litigation. On the other hand, if International
Shoe is regarded as requiring affirmative contacts on the part of the defendant
linking him with the forum state, this form of quasi in rem jurisdiction can
no longer be sustained.
This note will examine jurisdictional attachment of insurance in terms
of the light it sheds on the future of quasi in rein jurisdiction in general.
If the same standards are to be applied to all forms of adjudicatory authority,
the appropriateness of preserving quasi in rem jurisdiction as a category
is questionable, particularly since attachment of intangibles rests on fictional
premises.
Quasi In Rem

JUISDICTION:

A

GROWING

ANACHRONISM

Historically, quasi in rem jurisdiction has served to mitigate the restrictive
consequences of the personal jurisdiction theory articulated by the United
States Supreme Court in Pennoyer v. Neff.5 In Pennoyer, which laid the
theoretical framework for state court jurisdiction for the first half of the
twentieth century, the Court established physical presence in the forum
as the basis of adjudicatory authority.6 Focusing on the territorial limits
of state sovereignty, the Court emphasized that each state wielded exclusive
jurisdiction over persons and property within its borders, and conversely,
that no state possessed authority over persons and property beyond its
boundaries.? In addition, the Court advanced the basic proposition that
jurisdiction could not be asserted without service of process because lack of
notice created the potential for enforcement of fraudulent claims.8 Since
process servers could not deliver summons across state boundaries without
violating the territorial sovereignty of neighboring states, courts could acquire
jurisdiction over individuals only if they were personally served while within
the state or if they consented to jurisdiction by making a voluntary appearance. 9 This requirement significantly curtailed the availability of
5. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
6. It is commonly thought that the requirement of presence originated historically
in the sheriff's assertion of physical control over the defendant through arrest and
incarceration. See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 316; McDonald
v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917) (stating that "[tihe foundation of jurisdiction is physical
power .... .'). Physical power over persons or property also served as a means of insuring
that a judgment could be enforced once it had been rendered. Kurland, The Supreme
Court, the Due Process Clause and the in Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U.

Cnt. L. Rav. 569, 585 (1958). For the view that express or implied submisison rather
than physical power constituted the theoretical premise of jurisdiction at common law,
see Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and
Forum Conveniens, 65 YAiE L.J. 289 (1956). In the civil law, the primary basis of jurisdiction has traditionally been domicile. Developments in the Law: State-Court Jurisdiction,
73 RAIv. L. REV. 909, 91S-15 (1960).

7. 95 U.S. at 722. See note 14 infra concerning the unsoundness of this premise.
8. Id. at 726.
9. Id. at 733.
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in personam jurisdiction since defendants could avoid litigation by leaving
the forum. Pennoyer, however, provided a compensatory device in the form
of jurisdiction over property, recognizing that a resident with a claim against
an absent defendant could be unfairly deprived of a remedy simply because
the defendant had placed himself beyond the reach of the process server.' 0
With jurisdiction quasi in rem, a plaintiff can attach property that the defendant owns in the state and can obtain a judgment for an amount up to
the full value of the asset.:" Theoretically the judgment is against the res
itself, which is within the jurisdiction of the courts by virtue of its presence
12
in the state. However, the defendant is a named party to the suit, and his

property can be used to satisfy a claim in connection with a completely
unrelated matter.'3
Pennoyer's jurisdictional principles constituted a framework in which
notice requirements and concepts of territorial sovereignty were applied to
allocate judicial disputes to the states most likely to have a local interest
in the litigation. 14 In the absence of modern technology, the requirement
10. Id. at 723.
11. An action in rem was in theory a direct action against property to determine the
rights of all persons in it, while an action quasi in rem was an action between individual
claimants whose dispute might not necessarily involve pre-existing claims to the property
itself. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS 6-9 (1942). Quasi in rem jurisdiction did not exist at
early common law. Attachment was utilized as a means of compelling the defendant
to appear, but once he submitted to personal jurisdiction his property was released.
With the advent of the default judgment the property also came to be used to satisfy
the plaintiff's claim. Carrington, The Modern Utility of Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction, 76
HARV. L. REv. 303, 303-04 (1962).
12. While an unfavorable judgment did not impose personal liability - unlike a
judgment in personam, which could be satisfied from any assets owned by the defendant
quasi in rem action nonetheless affected the absent defendant's interests, as the
-a
Pennoyer Court implicitly recognized in arguing that seizure of property constituted
sufficient notice. If the defendant's interests were at stake, due process required that he
receive notice, but summons could not be served across state lines without violating the
Court's notions of territorial sovereignty. The fictional equation of notice with seizure,
on the theory that a person would surely know if property had been removed from his
possession, provided a rationale for reconciling these dual concerns. 95 U.S. at 727. Note,
Jurisidiction In Rem and the Attachment of Intangibles: Erosion of the Power Theory,
1968 DUKE L.J. 725, 731. See generally Note, The Requirement of Seizure in the Exercise
of Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction: Pennoyer v. Neff Re-Examined, 63 HARv. L. REv. 657 (1950).
13. In Pennoyer, real property owned by a nonresident defendant was seized in
satisfaction of a default judgment for unpaid attorney's fees. However, the Court held
the judgment void because there had not been a valid assertion of either in personam or
quasi in rem jurisdiction. The defendant had not been personally served, nor had his
property been seized prior to the rendering of a judgment.
14. Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 SuP. Cr. REv. 241, 245.
Hazard argues that this conceptual framework was overly formalistic even in its own
day. Id. at 271. The Court was greatly influenced by Justice Story's treatise. COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONFLicr OF LAWS (2d ed. 1841). Story in turn was influenced by the ideas of
the Dutch jurist Huber. Hazard, supra at 258-62. Hazard points out that application to
the American federalist system of principles derived from a European system of independent nation-states was theoretically unsound. Id. at 264-65. For example, the full faith
and credit clause led to the enforceability of judgments in the courts of sister states,
thus belying the notion that the states were independent soverignties. Id. at 247. Even
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that the defendant be physically present provided a fairly reliable mechanism

for selecting the most suitable forum,'5 while jurisdiction over property in
the state provided a counterweight to the restrictive consequences of the

presence rationale.16 As the development of modern means of transportation
and communication and the growth of nationwide commercial enterprise
lessened the importance of state boundaries as jurisdictional barriers, the
Pennoyer framework proved increasingly inappropriate.'1 Therefore, courts
began to stretch the territorial rationale to allow in personam suits against
absent defendants whose conduct affected the interests of state residents.' 8

Responding to the growth of interstate travel, one line of cases permitted
injured residents to maintain suits against nonresident motorists on the
theory that utilization of state highways constituted implied consent to
jurisdiction.' 9 The degenerating Pennoyer framework was maintained by
resort to the fiction that the visiting motorist appointed the secretary of

state or some other public official as his agent for receipt of process. 20 A

second line of cases sought to bring out-of-state corporations within the con-

ceptual structure of Pennoyer by relying upon the fiction of implied consent or upon the notion that the corporation was "present" and hence
2
amenable to process by virtue of "doing business" in the state. '
Repeated but inconclusive attempts to determine what quantum of
the Pennoyer Court recognized that the states did not wield independent jurisdictional
authority, for assertions of jurisdiction were held to be subject to the due process clause.
95 U.S. at 732-33.
15. von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79
HARV. L. REv. 1121, 1,137-38 (1966).
16. Carrington, supra note 11, at 805.
17. The Pennoyer Court itself implicitly recognized the inadequacy of this conceptual
structure, noting that its decision was not to be read as preventing jurisdiction over
absent defendants in actions governing personal status, e.g., divorce suits. 95 U.S. at 733-85
(stating that if the defendant's state did not recognzie such actions the plaintiff would
be totally without a remedy). Similarly, the Court approved the practice of requiring
foreign corporations to appoint local agents for the service of process. Id. at 735-36.
18. For detailed history of this development, see Kurland, supra note 6.
The growth of modem technology rendered the Pennoyer framework inadequate in a
second sense by making fleeting presence possible. Under the Pennoyer rationale, even
transient presence was sufficient to sustain jurisdiction so long as the defendant was personally served while within the borders of the state. Thus in Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F.
Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959), a district court upheld jurisdiction over a defendant who
had been served while a passenger in an airplane flying over the forum state. Like quasi
in rem jurisdiction, in personam jurisdiction over transients served to counter the restrictive
consequences of the personal service requirement. If personal service was mandatory, it
seemed only fair to allow the plaintiff to utilize the process servers of any state in which

the defendant might be found. However, as modern technology began to render presence
increasingly fleeting, service on defendants only temporarily present made more likely
assertion of jurisdiction over individuals who had no prior connection with the forum.
See generally Ehrenzweig, supra note 6.
19. E.g., Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928) (requiring actual notice to the
defendant); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
20. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. at 356-57, dispensing with the requirement of Kane v.
New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916) that the motorist make a formal appointment in writing.
21. See Kurland, supra note 6, at 577-86 for a summary of the cases.
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"doing business" constituted presence or implied consent, 22 in addition to
the recognition that a corporation is a legal fiction which cannot be deemed
physically present in any literal sense, eventually led the Supreme Court
to abandon attempts to justify expanded state court jurisdiction on the basis
23
In 1945, in the landmark case InternationalShoe Co. v. Washof Pennoyer.
2
ington, 4 the Court noted that holding a corporation "present" for purposes
of in personam jurisdiction in effect concludes that the corporation reasonably can be required to submit to suit on the basis of its dealings with the
forum state.2 5 Rejecting notions of territorial sovereignty as outdated, the
Court ruled that due process is met in the assertion of in personam jurisdiction when the absent defendant has "certain minimum contacts" with the
forum state "such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.' "26
The minimum contacts test articulated in International Shoe provided
the underpinning for long-arm statutes which were enacted in the years
following. These long-arm statutes allowed state courts to assert personal
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants on the basis of such activities as
the commission of a tortious act or the execution of a contract which had
an impact on citizens of the state.2 7 This expansion of in personam jurisdic22. Id.
23. The fictional nature of the inquiry had been recognized much earlier by Justice
Learned Hand. Huntchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139, 141-42 (2d Cir. 1930).
24. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
25. The defendant corporation, which sold goods through salesmen in the state of
Washington, sought to insulate itself from taxation by executing contracts and shipping
goods from outside the jurisdiction. When sued for contributions to Washington's unemployment compensation fund, the corporation argued that it was not doing business in
the state. The Court held that the systematic and continuous nature of the activities
conducted by the corporation's salesmen in the state and the fact that the suit grew out
of these same activities made the assertion of jurisdiction reasonable. Id. at 320. The
Court noted that under certain circumstances isolated transactions might likewise be
sufficient to sustain jurisdiction. Similarly, jurisdiction might be upheld even when the
cause of action did not relate to activities carried on in the state, provided the local
activities were systematic and continuous. Id. at 318. The test, the Court emphasized, was not
a mechanical or quantitative one, but rather a qualitative process of interest balancing in
which the defendant's "contacts, ties, or relations" with the state were to be evaluated in
terms of a standard of fundamental fairness. Id. at 319. In Perkins v. Benguet Consol.
Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952), the Court applied this balancing test to uphold jurisdiction in an action which was unrelated to the defendant's activities within the forum state
(jurisdiction of Ohio courts upheld in a suit growing out of corporate defendant's activities
in the Philippines when corporate records, funds, and offices of president were located
in Ohio).
26. 326 U.S. at 316. Of course, the notion of "fair play" involves further standards of
its own. For a brief attempt to define what is meant by this term, see Currie, The Growth
of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 ILL. L.F. 533,
534-35 (holding that fairness involves avoidance of undue inconvenience, expense, and
surprise; favorable choice of law factors; and an irreducible core of state sovereignty
considerations).
27. For an analysis of selected long-arm statutes, see Casad, Long Arm and Convenient
Forum, 20 KAN. L. REv. 1 (1971); Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of
Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 ILL. L.F. 533; Homburger, The Reach of New York's
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ion undercut the rationale of quasi in rem, jurisdiction, which appeared
less justifiable once absent defendants could be subjected to suit.2s Nevertheless, quasi in rem jurisdiction remained untouched by the Supreme Court
for more than thirty years after International Shoe29 Courts continued to
cite the classic pre-InternationalShoe case justifying quasi in rem jurisdiction,
Harrisv. Balk,30 as good law.
In Harris,the Court extended the Pennoyer framework to include garnishment of intangible property as a basis for quasi in rem jurisdiction. Harris,
a North Carolina resident, owed a debt to Balk, also a North Carolina resident; Balk in turn owed Epstein, a Maryland resident. When Harris happened
to be in Maryland, Epstein brought a garnishment proceeding against him
seeking to establish quasi in rem jurisdiction over Balk on the basis of the
debt that Harris owed Balk. The Court sustained jurisdictions, on the theory
that the debt "dung" to the debtor and therefore constituted property of
Balk's present in the state.3 2 Since intangibles. by their very nature do not
have a physical presence, the assignment of a situs to a debt was a fictional
Long-Arm Statute: Today and Tomorrow, 15 BuFFAxo L. Rxv. 61 (1965). For an exhaustive
bibliography on long-arm jurisdiction, see Comment, Long-Arm and Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction and the Fundamental Test of Fairness, 69 Mic. L. Rav. 300, 300 n.3. (1970).
28. For an expansive exercise of in personam jurisdiction, see McGee v. International
Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), in which the Court sustained jurisdiction over a nonresident insurance company on the basis of a single insurance contract which the defendant
had renewed with a resident of the forum state. See generally Ehrenzweig, Pennoyer is
Dead -Long Live Pennoyer, 80 Rocay Mr. L. REv. 285 (1958) (pointing out the attenuated
nature of the contacts). But see Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), in which the
Court resurrected the territorial language of Pennoyer to defeat jurisdiction over an outof-state trustee in a complicated dispute involving rival claimants to the assets of a decedent.
Limitations on the exercise of state court jurisdiction "are more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation," the Court stated. "They are a consequence
of-territorial limitations on the power of the respective States." Id. at 251. The International Shoe test could be satisfied only by a purposive act by which the defendant availed
itself of "the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State." Id. at 253. McGee
was distinguished as involving just such a purposive act. Id. at 252.
Hanson has proved troublesome to commentators in view of the steady expansion of
jurisdiction over nonresidents legitimized by International Shoe. Some commentators have
maintained that the Court manipulated jurisdictional principles in order to reach an
equitable result (the plaintiffs, already entitled to a substantial portion of the decedent's
estate, sought to claim the remaining assets on the ground that a power of appointment
by which they were to pass was invalid under state law). E.g., Zammit, Quasi-in-rem
Jurisdiction: Outmoded and Unconstitutional?, 49 ST. JoHN's L. Ray. 668, 677 (1975).
For further discussion of Hanson, see text accompanying notes 120-21 infra.
29. Quasi in rem jurisdiction may have continued to survive because it provided predictability and because it allowed the assertion of jurisdiction when state long-arm statutes
did not go as far in extending in personam jurisdiction as the due process clause would
allow. Comment, The Reasonableness Standard in State-Court Jurisdiction: Shaffer v.
Heitner and the Uniform Minimum Contacts Theory, 14 WARE FoR L. REV. 51 (1978).
20. 198 US. 215 (1905).
21. Id. at 222. Harris had paid Epstein pursuant to a default judgment which the
Court sustained when Balk sued Harris in North Carolina demanding payment of the debt.
32. The rationale was that the creditor could bring suit on the debt in the forum
state if the debtor was present, even though both were nonresidents. If the creditor could
sue the debtor wherever he went, it appeared that the, debt followed the debtor. Id. at 222-23.
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enterprise.3 3 Furthermore, it could have been held with equal plausibility
within the Pennoyer framework that a debt's locus is with the creditor.3 4
While situating the debt with the debtor served to afford plaintiffs a remedy
against defendants over whom they would not otherwise have jurisdiction,
it also allowed litigation in a forum unforeseeable by the defendant. With
tangible property, the defendant could control its situs and, therefore, might
be said to have availed himself of the forum's protection by choosing to own
land or chattels within the state. 35 In contrast, a defendant with an intangible
attachable debt interest would be amenable to jurisdiction wherever his
debtor happened to be.
Harris thus expanded the possibility of quasi in rem actions in which
the defendant had no prior relation with the forum. Such actions based on
the fiction of the presence of intangibles continued to remain viable even
after International Shoe, which revised the Pennoyer framework only as it
applied to in personam jurisdiction.
LIABILITY INSURANCE
PERPETUATION OF THE

AND THE FORMALISTIC

Pennoyer

FRAMEWORK

The potential unfairness of jurisdiction premised on the fictional presence
of intangibles was underscored in Seider v. Roth, in which the New York
Court of Appeals applied the Pennoyer-Harrisframework to include liability
36
insurance as an attachable debt for purposes of quasi in rem jurisdiction.
The action grew out of an auto accident in Vermont between New York
plaintiffs and a Canadian defendant.3 7 Unable to acquire personal jurisdiction
in New York under the state's long-arm statute, the plaintiffs proceeded
quasi in rem by attaching the defendant's liability insurance policy which
had been issued in Canada. The rationale, which flowed directly from Harris,
was that the insurer's contractual duty to defend and indemnify constituted
a debt owed to the defendant and that because the insurer was present in
New York by virtue of doing business in the state, the debt was present for
33. For an early critique, see Beale, The Exercise of Jurisdiction in Rem to Compel
Payment of a Debt, 27 HARV. L. REV. 107 (1913). See also Andrews, Situs of Intangibles in
Suits Against Nonresident Claimants, 49 YALE L.J. 241 (1939).
34. Hazard, supra note 14, at 278. Indeed, since the debt would be an asset of the
creditor's, it might be more logical to consider the debt as being situated with the creditor.
35. See Beale, supra note 33, at 121-22.
36. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
37. A second defendant was a New York resident over whom the plaintiffs were able
to acquire in personam jurisdiction. 17 N.Y.2d at 112, 216 N.E.2d at 313, 269 N.Y.S.2d at
100. Arguably, considerations of judicial economy and of fairness to both the plaintiff and
the New York defendant made the assertion of jurisdiction over the Canadian defendant
more reasonable, but the Court of Appeals did not pursue this line of inquiry. Multiple
litigation not only may have been wasteful and inconvenient, it also may have left the
plaintiff without a remedy if in separate actions each defendant could succeed in putting
the blame on his absent counterpart. Alternatively, it might have been argued that fairness
to the New York defendant favored bringing the Canadian defendant before the court
if the former's defense rested on testimony of the latter. See Comment, Jurisdiction: Quasi
In Rem Jurisdiction Obtained By Attaching Obligations Under an Automobile Liability
Policy, 51 MINN. L. REv. 158, 165 (1966).
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purposes of quasi in rem jurisdiction.3 The defendant contested the attachment on the ground that the insurer's obligations were contingent and
hence not attachable under New York law.3 9 A divided court of appeals
upheld jurisdiction, however, ruling that the insurer's obligations accrued
as soon as the accident occurred.4 r1 Rather than weigh the equities involved,
the majority engaged in technical analysis, applying the Pennoyer-Harris
framework. Finding the debt to be attachable within the meaning of the
statute, the court treated the duty to defend and indemnify as a fixed obliga41
tion which arose at the time of the accident.
The Seider decision elicited a large amount of critical comment. 42 Much
38. However, in Harris,since the debtor was an individual, the debt could be present
in only one place at a time. When the debtor was a corporation which was engaged in
multistate activity, the debt could be located in any number of states for purposes of
quasi in rem jurisdiction. In this sense Seider represented an expansion of the Harris framework. Comment, Garnishment of Intangibles: Contingent Obligations and the Interstate

Corporation,67 COLUM. L. R1v. 550, 563 (1967). Subsequent cases recognized the unfairness
of allowing quasi in rem jurisdiction wherever the insurer was doing business and limited
attachment of insurance to residents of the forum state. See notes 72-78 infra and accompanying text.
39. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw §5201(a) (McKinney 1963) provides: "A money judgment may
be enforced against any debt, which is past due or which is yet to become due, certainly
or upon demand of the judgment debtor, whether it was incurred within or without the
state, to or from a resident or non-resident, unless it is exempt from application to the
satisfaction of the judgment. A debt may consist of a cause of action which could be
assigned or transferred accruing within or without the state." N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAiw §6202
(McKinney 11963) provides: "Any debt or property against which a money judgment may
be enforced as provided in Section 5201 is subject to attachment."

40. 17 N.Y.2d at 113, 216 N.E.2d at 314, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 101. The court noted that
under the policy the insurer agreed to investigate, to negotiate a settlement at its discretion,
and to pay medical expenses of the insured and his passengers. These obligations accrued
as soon as the insurer received notice of the accident and were not dependent upon a
lawsuit actually being brought against the insured. Id.
41. The majority cited as precedent Matter of Riggle's Estate, '11N.Y.2d 73, 181 N.E.2d
436, 226 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1962), in which a liability insurance policy had been held sufficient
to sustain the appointment of an administrator for the estate of a nonresident defendant
who had been involved in an accident with the plaintiff in Wyoming. ;I17N.Y.2d at 114,
216 N.E.2d at 314, 269 N.YS.2d at 101-02. As the dissent pointed out, the case was distingnishable because the decedent had been personally served before his death. Thus the
appointment of an administrator had allowed the continuation of a preexisting action, not
the establishment of jurisdiction for a new action. 17 N.Y.2d at 116, 216 N.E.2d at 315,
269 N.Y.S.2d at 103. Moreover, the case involved interpretation of the statute governing
the appointment of administrators, not the attachment statutes that were at issue in
Seider. 17 N.Y.2d at 116, 216 N.E.2d at 316, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 104.
The dissent also argued that a direct action procedure was being implemented under
the guise of quasi in rem jurisdiction. In response, the majority stated that any direct
action was made possible by the fact that the insurer had agreed to defend the insured
wherever the latter was sued. 17 N.Y.2d at 114, 216 N.E.2d at 315, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 102.
42. Rosenberg, One Procedural Genie Too Many or Putting Seider Back into the
Bottle, 71 COLuM. L. Rav. 661 (171); Seidelson, Seider v. Roth et. seq.: The Urge Toward
Reason and the Irrational Ratio Decidendi, 39 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 42 (1970); Siegel,
Jurisdiction Ad Infinitum: New York's "Rem" Seizure of the Insurance Policy for Jurisdiction in Accident Cases, 20 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 99 (1971); Stein, Jurisdiction by Attachment of Liability Insurance, 43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1075 (1968); Comment, Judicially Enacted

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol30/iss5/5

8

Kelso: Jurisdictional Attachment of Liability Insurance in Light of Chan
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXX

of the criticism focused on technical flaws in the court's reasoning, pointing
out the differences between insurance and other attachable debts. Many
commentators reiterated the view expressed by the dissent 43 that the court
was engaged in bootstrapping by allowing contingent obligations to afford
44
jurisdiction for a suit which triggered these very obligations. Under this
view, because the duty to defend did not arise until an action had been
filed and the duty to indemnify did not accrue until a judgment had been
rendered, jurisdiction was made contingent on debts that were contingent on
jurisdiction.45 Other commentators pointed out that the duty to defend was
not attachable because the obligation was payable in services. 46 Since the
amount and character of services varied depending on the nature of the
plaintiff's action, attachment would pose valuation problems in the event
of a default judgment. 47 Furthermore, if the duty to defend was the basis
of jurisdiction, and litigation proceeded on the merits, the debt would be
consumed by the end of the lawsuit, leaving nothing to secure the plaintiff's
judgment.48 Both the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify were per49
sonal to the insured and could not be sold in execution of a judgment.
Moreover, if the insurer's duties were attachable by virtue of their presence
in the state, logically they would be amenable to attachment by general
creditors of the defendant, thus depriving both plaintiff and defendant
of the intended purpose of the insurance.5 0 Similarly, if additional plaintiffs
brought suit in another state on the same accident while a Seider action was
pending in New York, they would be deprived of a remedy because the
insurer as garnishee would be under a duty not to dissipate the garnished
debt. 51
Direct Action Statutes: Soundness of the New York Rule, 10 B.C. INDUS. & Com. L. REv. 711
(1969); Comment, Jurisdiction In Rem and the Attachment of Intangibles: Erosion of the
Power Theory, 1968 DUKE L.J. 725; Comment, Garnishment of Intangibles: Contingent
Obligations and the Interstate Corporation, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 550 (1067); Note, Attachment of Liability Insurance Polices, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 1108 (1968); Note, Seider v. Roth:
The Constitutional Phase, 43 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 58 (1968); Note, Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction Based on Insurer's Obligations, 19 STAN. L. REV. 654 (1967); 8 B.C. INDUS. & COM.
L. REV. 147 (1967); 33 BROOKLYN L. REV. 368 (1967); 16 BUFFALO L. REV. 769 (1967); 71
DICK L. REV. 653 (1967); 51 MINN. L. REV. 158 (1966); 18 SYRACUSE L. REV. 631 (1967); 35
U. CIN. L. REV. 691 (1966).
43. 17 N.Y.2d at 115, 216 N.E.2d at 316, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 103 (Burke, J., dissenting).
44. E.g., Comment, Garnishment of Intangibles, Contingent Obligations and the Interstate Corporation, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 550, 555 (1967); Note, Jurisdiction In Rem and the
Attachment of Intangibles: Erosion of the Power Theory, 1968 DUKE L.J. 725, 749-50; Note,
Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction Based on Insurer's Obligations, 19 STAN. L. REV. 654, 656-57
(1967).
45. 17 N.Y.2d at 115, 216 N.E.2d at 315, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 103. (Burke, J., dissenting).
46. Note, Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction Based on Insurer's Obligations, supra note 44, at
655-56.
47. 71 DICK. L. REv. 653, 665 (1967).
48. Comment, supra note 44, at 552.
49. Robinson v. O.F. Shearer & Sons, Inc., 429 F.2d 83, 86 (3d Cir. 1970).
50. Note, Jurisdiction In Rem and the Attachment of Intangibles: Erosion of the
Power Theory, 1-968 DuoaE L.J. 725, 752-53.
51. Id. at 752.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1978

9

Florida Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 5 [1978], Art. 5
ATTACHMENT OF LIABILITY INSURANCE

This type of reasoning led to rejection of the Seider procedure in other
states.52 Decisions denying attachment of liability insurance as a basis for
quasi in rem jurisdiction focused in particular on the contingent nature of
the insurer's debt, holding that such a debt could not be attached under the
relevant state statute.5 3 Only three states adopted the procedure, two of
these merely giving it temporary or qualified acceptance. 4 In general, state
courts were more impressed by the theoretical anomalies of quasi in rem
jurisdiction based on liability insurance, and the majority refused to recognize
it.
The significance of these theoretical difficulties was diminished by the
55
fact that the attachment of intangibles was a fictional enterprise. After it
52. Robinson v. O.F. Shearer & Sons, Inc., 429 F.2d 83 (3d Cir. 1970); Sykes V. Beal,
392 F. Supp. 1089 (D. Conn. 1975); Ricker v. Lajoie, 314 F. Supp. 401 (D. Vt. 1970); Hart
v. Cote, 145 N.J. Super. 420, 367 A.2d 1219 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976); Kirchman v.
Mikula, 258 So. 2d 701 (La. Ct. of App. 1972) (jurisdiction over nonresident defendants for
actions arising out of out-of-state accidents held not within the scope ofi Louisiana's
direct action statute); State ex rel. Govt. Employees Ins. Co. v. Lasky, 454 S.W.2d 942
(Mo. Ct. of App. 1970); Johnson v. Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co., 499 P.2d 1387 (Okla.
1972); De Rentiis v. Lewis, 106 R.I. 240, 258 A.2d 464 (1969); Howard v. Allen, 254 S.C. 455,
176 S.E.2d 127 (1970); Housley v. Anaconda Co., 19 Utah 2d 124, 427 P.2d 390 (1967).
53. See cases cited note 52 supra.
54. An appellate court in California refused to -vacate an attachment in a suit arising
out of a car repair incident in the state of Washington. Turner v. Evers, 31 CA.3d Supp.
11, 107 Cal. Rptr. 390 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1973); noted in 5 PAc. L.J. 115 (1974); 11
SAN DiEao L. REV. 504 (1974); and 5 Sw. U.L. REV. 417 (1974). The court reasoned that
California's attachment statute was very similar to New York's and that if liability insurance
could serve as the basis of jurisdiction in New York, it could do so in California as well.
However, this decision was subsequently overruled by the California supreme court on
much the same rationale used by other states in rejecting Seider. Javorek v. Superior Court
of Monterey County, 17 Cal. 3d 629, 522 P.2d 728, 131 Cal. Rptr. 768 (1976) (contingent
debt). Noted in 41 ALBANY L. REV. 187 (1977); 7 CUM. L. REV. 517 (1977); and 17 SANTA
CLARA L. REv. 189 (1977). Accord, Hoteles Camino Real, S.A. v. Superior Court. 70 Cal.
App. 3d 367, 138 Cal. Rptr. 807 (Ct. App. 1977) (contingent interests not attachable under
California's new attachment statute effective January 1, 1977).
New Hampshire gave qualified acceptance to Seider, apparently as a retaliatory gesture,
the court noting that the defendant was a New York resident who would have been able
to acquire quasi in rem jurisdiction in his own state. Forbes v. Boynton, 113 N.H. 617,
313 A.2d 129 (1973). In addition, a second defendant was a New Hampshire resident, thus
raising the possibility of multiple litigation if the action against the New York defendant
was dismissed. The court disclaimed any suggestion that quasi in rem jurisdiction would be
upheld in all instances. 119 N.H. at 624, 313 A.2d at 133. See Camire v. Scieszka, 116 N.H.
281, 358 A.2d 397 (1976), in which a Seider action was dismissed against a Missouri defendant,
and Ahern v. Hough, 116 N.H. 302, 358 A.2d 394 (1976), in which a Seider action was
dismissed against a Vermont defendant.
A federal district court in Minnesota sustained quasi in rem jurisdiction on the basis
of a Minnesota garnishment statute that had been amended after Seider to allow for
prejudgment attachment of insurance contracts. Rintala v. Shoemaker, 362 F. Supp. 1044
(D. Minn. 1973). That case was followed in Jeans v. Mitchell, 418 F. Supp. 730 (D. Minn.
1976). MINN. STAT. §571.41 Subd. 2(3) (1976) provides that "the garnishee may be held to
respond to any person for the claim asserted against the debtor in the main action."
55. See note 33 supra and accompanying text. See Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal.
2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957), appeal dismissed and cert. denied sub nom., Columbia Broad-

casting System, Inc. v. Atkinson, 357 U.S. 569 (1958), in which the California supreme
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became possible to assert in personam jurisdiction over absent defendants
in accordance with a reasonableness standard, the continued application
of quasi in rem jurisdiction based solely on the fictional presence of intangibles increasingly began to appear formalistic. The technical anomalies of a
Seider proceeding causes one to become enmeshed in the very same "arid
conceptualism" 56 which first marked quasi in rem jurisdiction when its praciical justification was reduced by the advent of long-arm statutes. The real
issue, as some commentators rightfully pointed out, was that jurisdictional
attachment of liability insurance could be unfair to the defendant. 57 For
example, it allowed a New York resident who was injured while traveling
in Hawaii to bring a defendant before the New York courts from hundreds
of miles away even though the defendant had no prior contact with the
forum state.5 8 By focusing only on the presence of an attachable debt, the
court of appeals had completely ignored the issue of unfairness to the
defendant.
In response to this criticism, subsequent cases addressed the fairness
argument, seeking to justify jurisdictional attachment of liability insurance
as a judicially enacted direct action procedure. In Simpson v. Loehmann, a
New York plaintiff attached an insurance policy issued by a corporation doing
business in New York in an action involving a boating accident with a
Connecticut defendant in Connecticut waters. 59 The court of appeals rejected
the defendant's challenge of the action as a violation of due process, holding
that the insurer was the real party in interest.60 After paying lip service
court rejected any distinction between a contested and uncontested debt for purposes of
jurisdiction. The court noted that whether or not the debt was acknowledged, the nonresident defendant could protect his interests only by appearing in court. The central
question was not the nature of the obligation but rather the fairness of making the
defendant submit to jurisdiction. 49 Cal. 2d at 346, 316 P.2d at 965. In addition, the
court held that because the situs of an intangible is a fiction, quasi in rern jurisdiction
should be asserted in accordance with a minimum contacts standard. 49 Cal. 2d at 345-46,
316 P.2d at 964-65. Utilizing these principles, the court ordered the lower court to take
jurisdiction over an out-of-state trustee who had received payments in accordance with
a collective bargaining agreement between employers and a musicians' union, all local
defendants. The plaintiff musicians claimed that the payments constituted wages that
were being illegally diverted to the trustee. This case was an early forerunner of Shaffer v.
Heitner. See notes 83-84 infra and accompanying text. Atkinson is noted in 46 CAL F. L.
REV. 637 (1958) and 10 STAN. L. REV. 750 (1958).
56. Comment, supra note 44, at 550.
57. Note, Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction Based on Insurer's Obligations, supra note
44, at 660.
58. It was possible for a New Yorker to bring suit in New York courts against a
resident of Hawaii for injuries arising out of an accident in Hawaii even though the
defendant had never set foot outside his own state. Cf. Jones v. McNeill, 51 Misc. 527,
273 N.Y.S.2d 517 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (New York court upheld quasi in rem jurisdiction over a
California defendant in a suit arising out of an accident in New Mexico).
59. 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967).
60. The defendant also alleged that the attachment constituted an undue burden
on interstate commerce and that it impaired contract obligations because the lack of a
limited appearance would encourage the insured to withhold cooperation from the insurer.
The court dismissed these two contentions, holding that the defendant, not being engaged
in interstate commerce, had no standing to raise a defense under the commerce clause,
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to Harris,61 Chief Judge Fuld noted that "the historical limitations on both
in personam and in rem jurisdiction, with their rigid tests, are giving way to
a more realistic and reasonable evaluation of the respective rights of
plaintiffs, defendants and the state in terms of fairness." 62 Viewed realistically, rather than in terms of the "magical and medieval concepts of presence
and power," a Seider action was in fact directed at the insurer, who provided
the defense and controlled the litigation.63 This approach was reiterated in
Minichiello v. Rosenberg,64 in which the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled that attachment of liability insurance was the equivalent of a judicially
created direct action and that it did not contravene the due process clause
as such.05 In the court's view, the New York legislature could constitutionally
have provided the state's residents with a comparable direct action statute,
given the state's interest in preventing injured parties from becoming public
wards.66
The Second Circuit Court went on to consider whether this form of direct
action would lead to unfair results if given collateral estoppel effect. In
a Seider proceeding, unlike a classic direct action, the insured would still be
and that even if he did, the court could find no basis for sustaining such a defense.
As for the argument that a Seider attachment impaired contract obligations by encouraging
defendants to default, the court stated that under New York law if the insured refused
to cooperate, the insurer could assert this fact as a defense in any action brought against
it. 21 N.Y.2d at 309 n.2, 234 N.E.2d at 670 n.2, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 635 n.2.
61. Presence of the insurance obligation was held to constitute sufficient property for
the exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction on the authority of Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215
(1905). 21 N.Y.2d at 310, 234 N.E.2d at 671, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 636.
62. 21 N.Y.2d at 311, 234 N.E.2d at 672, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 637.
63. Id. The court was badly split, however, with two judges new to the bench voting
with the majority only because they felt that Seider should not be overruled by virtue
of a fortuitious change in the court's make-up. 21 N.Y.2d at 214, 234 N.E.2d at 674, 287
N.Y.S.2d at 640.
Judge 'Keating, concurring, reiterated that the insurer was the real defendant and
argued on the basis of case law sustaining Louisiana's direct action statute that New York's
interest in providing a remedy to injured persons would be sufficient to sustain a direct
action statute in this instance (citing Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348
U.S. 60 (1954)). 21 N.Y.2d at 312, 234 N.E.2d at 673, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 638 (Keating, J.,
concurring).
Judge Burke, dissenting, pointed out that Watson allowed direct action only when
the injury occurred within the forum state. 21 N.Y.2d at 318-19, 234 N.E.2d at 676-77, 287
N.Y.S.2d at 643-44 (Burke, J., dissenting). His dissent parallels the dissent in Minichiello.
See text accompanying notes 137-41 infra. On direct action statutes see Note, Direct Action
Statutes: Their Operational and Conflict-of-Law Problems, 74 HAIv. L. Rv. 357 (1960).
64. 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969).
65. The plaintiff attached the liability insurance policy of a Pennsylvania defendant
in an action growing out of the death of her husband in a collision in Pennsylvania. The
defendant removed the case to federal court. A companion case involved an action against
Massachusetts defendants for injuries sustained by a New York plaintiff in a motor
scooter accident in Massachusetts. The defendants in both cases challenged the attachments as a violation of due process. See generally Note, Minichiello v. Rosenberg: Garnishment of Intangibles-In Search of a Rationale, 64 Nw. U.L. Rev. 407 (1969) (arguing
that the analogy between Seider and a direct action is not convincing).
66. 410 F.2d at 109-10. For the views of the dissent, see text accompanying notes
137-41 infra.
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a party to the suit. If collateral estoppel were applied to factual issues
decided in the case when a defense had proceeded on the merits, the defendant
would be estopped from relitigating the issues, although the insurer, rather
than the defendant, had conducted the defense in the first action. In effect,
a direct action against the insurer would be bootstrapped into an in personam
judgment against the insured. The Second Circuit Court felt that collateral
estoppel would be unconstitutional if used in this instance, but it nonetheless
held that no finding of a denial of due process could be made simply on the
possibility that another state might choose to apply collateral estoppel to
a New York proceeding in the future.67
Besides attempting to justify jurisdictional attachment of liability insurance as a direct action, the New York Court of Appeals sought to mitigate
the potential unfairness of the procedure by providing the defendant with an
opportunity for a limited appearance. Under New York jurisdictional statutes,
a defendant in a quasi in rem action could not litigate on the merits without submitting to in personam jurisdiction. 68 A federal district court sitting
in New York ruled that qwasi in rem jurisdiction based on liability insurance
constituted a denial of due process in view of this lack of a limited appearance.6 9 The court noted that the defendant was faced with the dilemma of
defaulting or exposing himself to liability beyond the face amount of his
insurance policy. Because default might jeopardize the defendant's right to
any policy benefits which were conditioned on his cooperating with the
insurer in his defense, the defendant could virtually be coerced into submitting to in personam jurisdiction without having met the minimum con-

67. Id. at 112. But see Seidelson, Seider v. Roth, et seq.: The Urge Toward Reason and
the Irrational Ratio Decidendi, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 42, 54-57 (1970) (arguing that
collateral estoppel would be fair because the insurer would have raised all the neccessary
defenses).
For an instance where the plaintiff evidently had the use of collateral estoppel in mind,
see Tjepkema v. Kenney, 59 Misc. 2d 670, 299 N.Y.S.2d 943 (Sup. Ct. 1969). The plaintiff
applied for a special preference for early trial, arguing that she would be foreclosed by the
statute of limitations if she wanted to proceed in personam in the defendant's home state
for damages in excess of a favorable New York judgment. The court denied her application, not wanting to give special consideration to Seider cases, and noted that the plaintiff
should have proceeded in personam at the outset.
68. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW §320(c) (McKinney 1963).
69. Podolsky v. Devinney, 281 F. Supp. 488 (S.D. N.Y. 1968); noted in 54 VA. L. Rav.
1426 (1968).
This due process issue had been raised, but not answered in an earlier case in the
New York courts. Lefcourt Sea Crest Hotel & Motor Inn, Inc., 54 Misc. 2d 376, 282 N.Y.S.2d
896 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
The limited appearance has been defended as a means of preventing plaintiffs with
questionable claims from winning default judgments by using the threat of unlimited
liability. On the other hand, it has been criticized on the ground that judicial economy
favors complete litigation of the dispute in a single action. Carrington, supra note 11, at
314. See generally Taintor, Foreign Judgment in Rem: Full Faith and Credit v. Res Judicata
in Personam, 8 U. Prrr. L. REv. 223 (1942); Developments in the Law--State Court Jurisdiction, supra note 6 at 953-55; Note, "Special" Appearances to Contest the Merits in
Attachment Suits, 97 U. PA. L. REv. 403 (1949).
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tacts test of International Shoe.70 Shortly after this decision, the New York
Court of Appeals took cognizance of the federal court's ruling, holding
contrary to prior law that liability in a Seider action would be limited to the
face amount of the policy even when the defendant proceeded with a defense
on the merits. 71
In addition to creating a limited appearance, the courts sought to alleviate the unfairness of jurisdiction based on liability insurance by limiting
the procedure to plaintiffs who reside in the forum state.72 If a nonresident
were allowed to acquire quasi in rem jurisdiction in New York simply by
virtue of the fact that the defendant's insurer was doing business in the
state, 73 plaintiffs would be drawn to New York in the hope of taking advantage of the state's notoriously high jury verdicts. 74 Moreover, nonresidents
70. 281 F. Supp. at 495-97. The court also held that if the insurer advised the defendant
that it would not be in his interest to appear, the insurer might not be able to raise lack of
cooperation as a defense. Consequently a default judgment would violate the insurer's
due process rights as well because the insurer would be liable for the judgment without
having had the opportunity to litigate on the merits. Id. at 498-500.
71. Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 989, 238 N.E.2d 319, 290 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1968)
(denying defendant's motion for reargument). One commentator termed the decision a
"miraculous per curiam opinion" for creating a limited appearance in the face of prior
legislative rejection of this procedural mechanism. Siegel, Supplementary Practice Commentary on New York Civ. Prac. Law §5201 at 15 (McKinney Supp. 1968). Subsequently
the New York legislature amended the statute to conform to this decision. N.Y. Crv. PRAc.
LAw §320(c) (McKinney 1972) (amended 1969).
In adopting Seider, both the California court and the federal court in Minnesota performed similar "miracles" on state rules disallowing limited appearances. Turner v. Evers,
31 C. App. 3d Supp. 11, 24, 107 Cal. Rptr. 390 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1973); Rintala v.
Shoemaker, 362 F. Supp. 1044, 1054-55 (D. Minn. 1973).
72. In Vaage v. Lewis, 29 A.D.2d 315, 288 N.Y.S.2d 521 (App. Div. 1968), a New York
appellate court dismissed an action brought by a Norwegian resident against North Carolina
defendants for injuries sustained in a North Carolina accident. The court held that allowing nonresidents to acquire jurisdiction would have detrimental effect on the administration of justice in New York by inviting law suits from out of state (dismissal on the basis
of forum non conveniens). On forum non conveniens dismissals, see note 110 infra. In Farrell v.
Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 411 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 840 (1969), a
Seider attachment was dismissed when a calculated attempt was made to take advantage
of a New York forum in a wrongful death action by appointing New York administrators
for the estates of nonresident decedents. Accord, Adkins v. Northfield Foundry & Machine
Co., 393 F. Supp. 1079 (D. Minn. 1974), Varady v. Margolis, 303 F. Supp. 23 (S.D. N.Y.
9168); Durgin v. Burnette, 54 A.D.2d 1065, 388 N.Y.S.2d 766 (App. Div. 1976). In Fish v.
Bamby Bakers, Inc., 76 F.R.D. 511 (N.D.N.Y. 1977), a federal district court held that
the plaintiff had to be a resident of the forum state when the accident occurred, not when
suit was brought.
73. It was pointed out in Simpson that virtually any substantial insurer would be
doing business in New York. 21 N.Y.2d at 316, 234 N.E.2d at 675, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 641.
See Beja v. Jahangiri, 453 F.2d 959 (2d Cir. 1972), in which the insurer operated through
an independent agent in New York who in 1969 sold $15,000 of workmen's compensation
insurance, $100 of automobile personal injury insurance, and $60 of property damage
insurance. The court held that the insurer was doing business in New York for purposes
of a Seider attachment.
74. In Simpson, New York was described as a "mecca" for plaintiffs seeking high
verdicts. 21 N.Y.2d at 316, 234 N.E.2d at 675, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 641.
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would be able to reap the benefit of any advantages in New York's procedural
law or choice of law rules.75 Substantive law might be an added factor encouraging forum shopping, as New York does not limit damages in wrong-

ful death actions.76
In an exception to the New York plaintiff limitation, several lower
courts allowed nonresidents to attach liability insurance when the case
involved a New York codefendant, in order to circumvent a multiplicity of
litigation or to prevent prejudice to the plaintiff or the New York defendant. 77
However, the court of appeals subsequently ruled in a case brought against
a New York codefendant that attachment of liability insurance was not
available to non-New Yorkers.78 The court stated that the insurer's obligations were "not of sufficient importance to support quasi in rem jurisdiction
when the plaintiff is a nonresident." 197 As the dissent observed, under straight
Pennoyer-Harrisprinciples, if the debt was present, it ought to have been
garnishable whether or not the plaintiff resided in the forum state. 0 That
quasi in rem jurisdiction would not be sustained when the plaintiff was a
nonresident showed how far afield the courts had moved from the traditional
Harris framework.8 1
The limitation of a Seider proceeding to citizens of the forum, the creation of a limited appearance, and the justification of Seider as a judicially
created direct action revealed the eroded rationale underlying quasi in rem
jurisdiction. While jurisdiction in Seider actions continued to be justified
on the theoretical basis of presence of property, courts groped for limitations
75. Comment, supra note 44, at 566.
76. The New York courts have refused to apply damages limitations of other states
in Seider proceedings. Rosenthal v. Warren, 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1973) Massachusetts
limit on wrongful death recoveries not applied when decedent died as result of alleged
medical malpractice after an operation in a Boston hospital); Tjepkema v. Kenney, 31
A.D.2d 908, 298 N.Y.S.2d 175 (App. Div. 1969) (accident in Missouri, Missouri'§ limitation
on wrongful death actions not applied); Tickel v. Oddo, 66 Misc. 2d 586, 320 N.Y.S.2d 268
(Sup. Ct. 1971) (accident in Maine, Maine's limitation on damages not applied). The
N.Y. CONST. Art I, §16, prohibits limitations on wrongful death recoveries.
While the New York courts have limited the availability of Seider actions to residents
of the forum, they have refused to allow nonresident defendants to escape Seider attachments
(and attendant consequences such as application of New York damages law) by contracting
out of such actions in insurance agreements. Provisions in insurance contracts excluding
coverage for suits brought on the basis of the contracts themselves have been declared
void on public policy grounds. Seligman v. Tucker, 46 A.D.2d 402, 362 N.Y.S.2d 881 (App.
Div. 1975) (provision void even though the Superintendent of Insurance had approved
the form contract).
77. Menefee v. Floyd & Beasley Transp. Co., Inc., 84 Misc. 2d 547, 378 N.Y.S.2d 555
(Sup. Ct. 1975); McHugh v. Paley, 63 Misc. 2d 1092, 314 N.Y.S.2d 208 (Sup. Ct. 1970). Cf.
Seafood Imports, Inc. v. A.J. Cunningham Pkg. Corp., 405 F. Supp. 5 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(jurisdiction upheld for nonresident third party plaintiff). On prejudice to the plaintiff
or the New York defendant, see note 37 supra.
78. Donawitz v. Danek, 42 N.Y.2d 138, 366 N.E.2d 253, 397 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1977).
79. 42 N.Y.2d at ,142, 366 N.E.2d at 256, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 595.
80. 42 N.Y.2d at 152, 366 N.E.2d at 259, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 602.
81. Although the plaintiff in Harris had been a citizen of the forum state, nothing in
the holding had explicitly limited the case to resident plaintiffs.
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that would mitigate the resulting inequities and felt obliged to explain
why this form of litigation was not fundamentally unfair.
Shaffer v. Heitner AND TE NEW STANDARD FOa.
Quasi In Rem JUISDICTnON
Efforts to mitigate the potential unfairness of quasi in rem jurisdiction
based on attachment of liability insurance evidenced a growing discomfort
that the Harris framework was increasingly unworkable under the modern
jurisdictional principles articulated in InternationalShoe. Attempts to justify
Seider actions in terms of a reasonableness standard presaged the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Shaffer v. Heitner, which applied the International
Shoe test to quasi in rem as well as to in personam jurisdiction. 82 In this
landmark case, the Court responded to the inequities occasioned by retention
of the Pennoyer framework in the wake of the development of long-arm
jurisdiction. Ground work for the decision was laid by a growing body of

commentarys and case law84 critical of quasi in rem jurisdiction as an
anachronism and calling for the extension of the minimum contacts test to all
assertions of state court jurisdiction.
Shaffer was a shareholder's derivative suit initiated in Delaware by a nonresident against Greyhound, a Delaware corporation, Greyhound's California
subsidiary, and twenty-eight past and present officers and directors.8 5 The
plaintiff charged the officers and directors with violating their fiduciary duties
to the corporation by engaging in activities in Oregon which ultimately

82. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). See generally Casad, Shaffer v. Heitner: An End to Ambivalence
in Jurisdiction Theory?, 26 KAN. L. REv. 61 (1977); Leathers, Substantive Due Process
Controls of Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction, 66 Ky. L.J. 1 (1977); Olsen, Shaffer v. Heitner:
A Survey of Its Effects on Washington Jurisdiction, 13 GONz. L. REv. 72 (1977); Comment,
Quasi In Rem on the Heels of Shaffer v. Heitner: If International Shoe Fits, 46 FOR]DHAM
L. REv. 459 (1977); Comment, The Expanded Scope of the Sufficient Minimum Contacts
Standard: Shaffer v. Heitner, 63 IowA L. REv. 504 (1977); Comment, The Reasonableness
Standard in State-Court Jurisdiction: Shaffer v. Heitner and the Uniform Minimum Contracts Theory, 14 WAKE FoaRsr L. PEv. 51 (1978); 11 AKRON L. REV. 333 (1977); 9 Tx.
TEcH. L. REV. 126 (1977); 52 Tvs.. L. REv. 171 (1977); 1977 UTAH L. REv. 361.
83. See, e.g., Carrington, The Modern Utility of Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction,-76 HAv.
L. REv. 303 (1962); Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction. 1965 S. Cr. REv.
211; Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEx." L. REv. 657 (1959); von Mehren
&- Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1121
(1966); Zammit, Quasi-in-rem Jurisdiction: Outmoded and Unconstitutional?, 49 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 668 (1975); Note, Jurisdiction in New York: A Proposed Reform, 69 CoLUM. L.
REv. 1412 (1969); Note, Jurisdiction In Rem and the Attachment of Intangibles: Erosion
of the Power Theory, 1968 DUKE L.J. 725 [hereinafter cited as Jurisdiction in Rem];
Developments in the Law - State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. REv. 909, 948-66 (1960);
Comment, Long-Arm and Quasi in Rem Jurisdictionand the Fundamental Test of Fairness,
69 MIcH. L. 1Rxv. 300 (1970).
84. E.g., U.S. Industries v. Gregg, 540 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 908
(1977); Jonnet v. Dollar Savings Bank, 530 F.2d 1123, 113043 (3d Cir. 1976) (Gibbons, J.,
concurring); Bekins v. Husih, 1 Ariz. App. 258, 401 P.2d 743 (1965); Atkinson v. Superior
Court, 49 Cal. 2d 338; 316 P.2d 960 (1957), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 357 U.S.
569 (1958).
85. The plaintiff owned one share of stock in Greyhound. 433 U.S. at 189.
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led to corporate liability for damages and a criminal contempt fine in an
antitrust action. 86 Since the individual defendants were nonresidents, the
plaintiff proceeded pursuant to Delaware's sequestration statutes " attaching
Greyhound stock owned by twenty-one of the defendants.8 The stock was
deemed present in the state by virtue of a statute making Delaware the situs
of all stock owned in Delaware corporations."s The Court held that Delaware's
attempted assertion of jurisdiction violated the due process clause because
the defendants lacked sufficient contacts with the state under standards set
forth in International Shoe.90
The Court noted, as many commentators had pointed out,91 that jurisdiction over property is in fact jurisdiction over the interests of persons in the
property. 92 Once it was apparent that the legal interests of persons were at
issue, it followed that the standards enunciated in International Shoe would
86. Mt.. Hood Stages, Inc. v. Greyhound Corp., 555 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1977), appeal
pending, 98 S. Ct. 716 (1978); United States v. Greyhound Corp., 508 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. .1974).
87. DEL. CODE ANN., tit 10 §366 (1974). The sequestration statute is a means of compelling the defendant to submit to in personam jurisdiction. If the defendant makes a
general appearance, the property may be released upon application by the defendant unless
the plaintiff can show there is a reasonable possibility that a judgment may not be paid.
If the defendant defaults, the property is sold to satisfy the judgment. See generally Folk
& Moyer, Sequestration in Delaware: A Constitutional Analysis, 73 COLUM. L. REy. 749
(1973) (arguing that the statute was open to constitutional challenge because of overbreadth and because of failure to provide a limited appearance). The statute was ordinarily used in shareholder derivative suits but was not limited to this type of action. Folk
and Moyer advocated replacing it.
with a narrowly drawn long-arm statute. Id. at 750, 798-99.
88. The sequestered stock was worth approximately $1.2 million. 433 U.S. at 192 n.7.
89. DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8 §169 (1974). In most other jurisdictions under U.C.C. §8-137(1)
(1972 version) stock is deemed present for attachment purposes only if the certificates are
present.
90. 43 U.S. at 213-17. The Court did not rule on the defendant's second contention
that jurisdictional attachment violated procedural due process requirements, although the
lower courts had devoted the bulk of their attention to this issue. Id. at 2572. See Mitchell
v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974) (prejudgment attachment requires immediate postseizure hearing); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (prejudgment attachment of all
forms of property requires meaningful notice); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S.
337 (1969) (prejudgment attachment of wages requires notice and prior hearing). It has
been suggested that jurisdictional attachment should be treated as an extraordinary situation that would not require the procedural safeguards held necessary when property is
attached as security for an in personam judgment. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. at 91
n.23. But see Note, Quasi in Rein Jurisdiction and Due Process Requirements, 82 YALE L.J.
1023 (1973) (arguing that procedural due process should be applicable to jurisdictional
attachment as well).
91. E.g., Hazard, supra note 83, at 268; Note, Jurisdiction In Rem, supra note 83,
at 762-65.
92. As noted earlier, the Pennoyer court implicitly recognized this fact in arguing
that seizure served as constructive notice. See note 12 supra. The Supreme Court paid
further deference to this notion in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306 (1950), when it held that actual notice reasonably calculated to apprise the
defendant of the suit was required whether an action was classified as in personam or
quasi in rem. 433 U.S. at 205-06. For an early recognition of this principle by Justice
Holmes, see Tyler v. Court of Registration, 175 Mass. 71, 76, 55 N.E. 812, 814, appeal
dismissed, 179 U.S. 405 (1900) ("[a]ll proceedings, like all rights, are really against persons.').
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apply. If a direct assertion of in personam jurisdiction did not comport
with fair play and substantial justice, an indirect assertion of jurisdiction
quasi in ren likewise could not stand. While the Court acknowledged that
presence of the property might indicate a relationship between the defendant,
the litigation, and the forum state9 3 - for example, when the litigation
involved title to the property itself94 or when it concerned rights and obligations connected with ownership of the property95 - the Court held that
presence alone would not be a sufficient basis on which to assert jurisdiction.96
Absent "other ties among the defendant, the State, and the litigation," suit
97
could not be maintained.
Thus Shaffer constituted a virtual overruling of Harris,in which jurisdiction was sustained on the basis of the presence of a debt which was unrelated to the underlying cause of action.98 The question that remains is
whether Seider, which grew out of the Pennoyer-Harrisframework, will fall
as well in the wake of Shaffer.99 A number of quasi in rem actions based on
liability insurance have arisen in the lower courts since Shaffer, but their
results are inconclusive. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has refused
to dismiss an action brought by a New York plaintiff against Virginia defendants, holding that jurisdiction was not fundamentally unfair to either the
93. 433 U.S. at 207.
94. E.g., the traditional in rem action. Id. at n.24.
95. E.g., a quasi in rem action for personal injuries sustained because of a hazard
negligently maintained on land of the absent defendant. Id. at 208.
96. The Court rejected the rationale that property alone should serve as a basis of
jurisdiction as a means of preventing defendants from secreting their property in states
where they were not amenable to in personam jurisdiction. If this were the justification,
the Court noted, then some attempt should have been made to distinguish those instances
in which the property was present in the state for other motives. Moreover, because of
the full faith and credit clause, it simply was not true that the debtor could evade his
obligations by placing his property in another jurisdiction. Id. at 209-10.
97. Id. at 209.
98. The Court did not explicitly overrule prior case law but stated that to the extent
that previous decisions were incompatible with the International Shoe test, they were
overruled. Id. at 208 n.30.
99. The Court has previously declined to rule on jurisdictional attachment of liability
insurance. Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844
(1969); Victor v. Lyon Assoc., Inc., 211 N.Y.2d. 295, 234 N.E.2d 459. 287 N.Y.S.2d 424 (1967),
appeal dismissed sub nom., Hanover Ins. V. Victor, 393 U.S. 7 (1968). The Court did -not
refer to jurisdictional attachment of insurance in Shaffer, but it did cite a case in which
the New Hampshire Supreme Court utilized a pre-Shaffer application of the fair play
and substantial justice test to dismiss a Seider action. Camire v. Scieszka, 1,16
N.H. 281,
358 A.2d 397 (1976). The case was cited along with several others as "well-reasoned" lower
court opinions questioning the traditional basis of quasi in rem jurisdiction. 433 U.S. at 205.
In Camire, a New Hampshire plaintiff brought suit against a Missouri defendant for injuries
arising out of an accident in Connecticut. The court held that attachment would not
confer jurisdiction automatically: jurisdiction would have to be reasonable from the
standpoint of the state's interest in the controversy and it would have to conform to the
fair play and substantial justice test articulated in International Shoe. Under these standards,
upholding the attachment would be unreasonable because the only contact with the forum
state was the plaintiff's residence. The defendant had done nothing to invoke New Hampshire jurisdiction, and he would not have been able to acquire quasi in rem jurisdiction
in his own state.
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insured or the insurer. 00 Meanwhile, other New York cases have resulted in
dismissal of insurance attachments on the ground that the insured lacked
sufficient contact with the forum state. 101 The Supreme Court itself has refused
to rule directly on this form of quasi in rem jursidiction, remanding an
appeal to the Minnesota state courts for further consideration in light of
02
Shaffer.1
FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNEss

Whether or not quasi in ren jurisdiction based on liability insurance
meets the standards set forth in InternationalShoe depends upon the interpretation of those standards. 0: '- If InternationalShoe is viewed as allowing jurisdiction when facts and circumstances indicate that requiring the defendant's
submission to suit would not be fundamentally unfair, an argument can
100. O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1978) (affirming the
district court's determination that a Seider proceeding is sui generis, classifiable as neither
in rem nor in personam). The court reiterated its holding in Minichiello that the insured
was not deprived of property which he could put to other uses and that no deprivation
of due process could be found on the basis of potential "horribles" such as the application
of collateral estoppel which had yet to occur. Id. at 198-200, 202. On Minichiello, see notes
106-11 infra and accompanying text.
For other Seider actions in which jurisdiction has been upheld, see Alford v. McGaw,
61 A.D.2d 504, 402 N.Y.S.2d 499 (App. Div. 1978); Rodriguez v. Wolfe, 93 Misc. 2d 364,
401 N.Y.S.2d 442 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
101. In Kennedy v. Deroker, 91 Misc. 2d 648, 398 N.Y.S.2d 628 (Sup. Ct. 1977). the
court refused to sustain jurisdiction over a Massachusetts defendant for a suit growing out
of an accident in Massachusetts. The court, citing Hanson, held that the defendant's
involvement in an accident in his home state was not conduct by which he purposively
availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities in New York, the forum state.
See note 28 supra. In Katz v. Umansky, 92 Misc. 2d 285, 399 N.Y.S.2d 412 (Sup. Ct. 1977),
two New York physicians were sued in personam for leaving a foreign object inside the
plaintiff during the course of an operation in a New York hospital. They brought a third
party action against a New Jersey physician who had treated the plaintiff in New Jersey
subsequent to the operation. The court dismissed the third party suit, which was initiated
by attachment of the defendant's medical malpractice insurance, on the ground that the
defendant lacked contacts with the forum state. Accord, Rocca v. Kenney, N.H. 381 A.2d 330 (1977). See also Wallace v. Target Store, Inc., 92 Misc. 2d 454, 400 N.Y.S.2d
478 (Sup. Ct. 1977), and Attanasio v. Ferre, 93 Misc. 2d 661, 401 N.Y.S.2d 685 (Sup. Ct.
1977) (holding that attached property does not provide sufficient contacts between defendant
and forum state).
102. Savchuk v. Rush, 187 Minn. 416, 245 N.W.2d. 624 (Minn. 1976), vacated and
remaned for further consideration in light of Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). This
case involved an action by a Minnesota plaintiff against an Indiana defendant for injuries
sustained in an accident in Indiana. The plaintiff was an Indiana resident at the time
of the accident. The Minnesota Supreme Court denied defendant's motion to dismiss
the attachment, holding that liability would be fair if limited to the face amount of the
insurance policy.
103. See Casad, Shaffer v. Heitner: An End to Ambivalence in Jurisdiction Theoy?,
26 KAN. L. REV. 61 (1977), concerning the ambivalence of the International Shoe test.
Casad finds that certain courts have emphasized the need for some sort of physical connection between the defendant and the forum state while other courts have interpreted
International Shoe as a fundamental fairness test. In his view, the Court in Shaffer leaned
toward the physical contacts approach.
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be made that jurisdictional attachment of insurance will still be viable. 04
First, unlike the property in quasi in rem actions of the Harris type, the
attached debt bears a relationship to the litigation since liability insurance
is purchased for the very purpose of paying damages in the event of suit. °5
As the Second Circuit Court of Appeals noted in Minichiello, an unfavorable
judgment in Harrisdeprived the defendant of property which he could have
used for whatever objectives he saw fit, whereas in an action based on attachment of insurance the attached debt cannot be applied to other purposes
if suit is never brought. 08 Moreover, in the usual type of quasi in rem action,
the defendant must supply his own legal counsel, while in a Seider proceeding
by the very terms of the attached debt the insurer conducts the defense on
behalf of the defendant. 07 Second, potential unfairness to the defendant is
lessened by the existence of federal diversity jurisdiction, 08 with the attendant
availability of removal and transfer of venue, 0 9 and by the possibility that
a state court action may be dismissed on the basis of forum non conveniens.110
104. See Alford v. McGaw, 61 A.D.2d 504, 402 N.Y.S.2d 499, 502 (App. Div. 1978),

upholding a Seider attachment on the ground that "[e]ssentially, the jurisdictional test must
be one of fairness."
105. However, the property itself did not give rise to the litigation, thereby providing
the requisite contacts between the defendant and the forum state. See Attanasio v. Ferre,
93 Misc. 2d 661, 401 N.Y.S.2d 685, 687 (Supp. Ct. 1977); Wallace v. Target Store, Inc.,
92 Misc. 2d 454, 458, 400 N.Y.S.2d 478, 481 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
106. Minichiello v. Rosenberg, on rehearing en banc, 410 F.2d 117, 118 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969). Rehearing was granted in response to the defendant's contention that the court had failed to consider the burdens placed upon the defendant when
it analogized Seider to a direct action procedure. On rehearing, the court noted that a
Seider defendant enjoyed a more favorable position than did the defendant in Harrisv. Balk,
but held that in any case jurisdictional attachment of insurance would continue to be
viable so long as Harrisis good law.
In O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1978), which was decided
after Shaffer, the Second Circuit affirmed its statements in Minichiello concerning fairness
to the insured.
107. Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d at 118.
108. Id. at 119.
,109. 28 U.S.C. §§1441, 1404(a) (1976). For cases allowing transfer of venue, see Societe
Commerciale de Transport Transatlantiques v. S.S. "African Mercury," 366 F. Supp. 1347
(S.D.N.Y. 1973); Ryer v. Harrisburg Kohl Bros., 307 F. Supp. 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Ladson
v. Kibble, 307 F. Supp. 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Jarvik v. Magic Mountain Corp., 290 F. Supp.
998 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
110. Forum non conveniens is the state court counterpart to transfer of venue in the
federal courts. Assuming that there is a more suitable forum, a state court may decline to
exercise jurisdiction for the convenience of the courts or the parties or in the interests
of justice. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). See generally Barrett, The Doctrine
of Forum Non Conveniens, 35 CAuF. L. REv. 380 (1947). The doctrine arose in response
to the unfairness occasioned by jurisdiction over transients. See note 18 supra. Some commentators have argued that as transient jurisdiction declines, the tests for personal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens should become one and the same. E.g., A. EHRENZWEIG,
A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 122-23 (1962); Traynor, supra note 83, at 663-64.
But see Developments in the Law, State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REv. 909, 1008-14
(1.9.60) (noting that undue burden on the courts is a criterion for forum non conveniens
but not for jurisdiction).
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Such procedural mechanisms, however, will not be automatically available
to the defendant.11 1 An action cannot be removed to federal court if there
is a codefendant who is a resident of the forum state 1 2 or if the amount in
controversy is less than $10,000.1 3 In addition, both transfer of venue and
dismissal on the basis of forum non conveniens are remedies discretionary
with the trial judge. 1 14 More importantly, even if quasi in rem jurisdiction
based on liability insurance does not seem fundamentally unfair to the
defendant because the insurer conducts the defense and pays the judgment,
the question remains whether this form of jurisdiction meets the fair play
test as articulated in International Shoe. The due process standard was expressed in InternationalShoe in terms of a minimum contacts standard. The
Court stated that jurisdiction would be upheld not simply when it seemed
fair to do so but only when the defendant had "certain minimum contacts
with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' ",115
MINIMUM:

CONTACTS OF THE DEFENDANT

The Court's use of the term "minimum contacts" evidenced the lingering
influence of Pennoyer's territorialism on the language of state court jurisdiction.1' 6 Although the Court sought to articulate a modern rationale in
InternationalShoe to replace physical presence as the basis of adjudicatory
authority, the terminology of presence continued in the court's discussion of
"contacts" and the nature and scope of a defendant's "activitiess in the
state."' 7 Clearly the Court did not mean to require physical presence for
the assertion of jurisdiction, since the presence of a legal entity like a corporation was acknowledged to be a fiction." 8 Yet the term "minimum contacts"
was apparently more than a symbolic device couched in the language of
Pennoyer for summing up all the facts and circumstances which would make
an assertion of jurisdiction fundamentally fair. The Shaffer Court looked to
1l.

Minichiello v. Rosenberg, on rehearing en banc, 410 F.2d at 122

(Anderson, J.,

dissenting).
112. 28 U.S.C. §1332 (1976); Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267
(requiring complete diversity).
113. 28 U.S.C. §1332 (1976).
1'14.

(1806)

See Jones v. Walt Disney World Co., 409 F. Supp. 526 (W.D.N.Y. 1976) (refusing

transfer of venue); Barrios v. Dade County, 310 F. Supp. 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
In some jurisdictions, forum non conveniens has been held unavailable if either the
plaintiff or the defendant is a resident of the forum state. E.g., De La Bouillerie v. DeVienne,
300 N.Y. 60, 89 N.E.2d 15 (1949). But see Silver v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 29 N.Y.2d 356,
278 N.E.2d 619, 328 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1972) (Seider proceeding dismissed on the basis of
forum non conveniens although the plaintiff was a resident of the forum state, thus reversing a long standing policy against use of the doctrine when one of the parties was a resident).

115. 326 US. at 316.
116. Kurland, supra note 6, at 589-90. Kurland argues that in International Shoe the
Court was bent less on overruling Pennoyer than on stating a theory for rationalizing
prior cases decided within the framework of Pennoyer on the fictive basis of presence or
consent. Id. at 586, 589.

117. 326 US. at 316, 317.
118. Id. at 316-17.
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"contacts" of the corporate defendant which took the form of systematic and

continuous activities conducted by the corporation's agents in the forum
state.119
In subsequent cases, including Shaffer, the Court indicated that some
sort of voluntary relationship would be required between the defendant and
the forum state in order to meet the minimum contacts test. In Hanson v.
Denckla,"20 the Court refused to sustain long-arm jurisdiction over an outof-state trustee on the basis of transactions continued with the settlor when
the latter moved to the forum state. The Court held that the requisite contact with the forum would be satisfied not by a unilateral assertion of ties
with the defendant but only by a purposive act by which the defendant
invoked the benefit of the laws of the state. 121 This language was reiterated
in Shaffer to deny quasi in rem jurisdiction on the basis of an alleged interest
on the part of the forum state in regulating the management of domestic
corporations. 1 22 The plaintiff in Shaffer alleged that the defendants' positions
as officers or directors constituted a sufficient jurisdictional nexus given the
state's interest in overseeing the activities of corporations chartered under
Delaware law. 12 3 However, the Court held that the sequestration statute
under challenge failed to assert this interest,X24 and that even if such. an
interest were conceded, Pelaware nevertheless could not claim jurisdiction.1
"2
In the majority's view, the state's interest in supervising the management
of domestic corporations would merely indicate that Delaware law should
126
be applied.
. Thus the Court rejected the argument advanced by some commentators
that choice of law considerations should be merged with jurisdictional tests to
uphold jurisdiction of the state whose law will govern the resolution of
119. Id. at 320.
10. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).

121. Id. at 258.
122. 438 U.S. at 216.
123. Id.

124. Although the statute was frequently utilized in shareholder's derivative actions,
it was not limited by its terms to this form of litigation. The Court noted that the statute
was both too broad and too narrow to apply to the interests asserted by the plaintiff.
Because it allowed the assertion of jurisdiction based solely on presence of the defendant's
property, it applied to all nonresident property owners, not simply to corporate fiduciaries,
and it failed to reach officers and directors who did not happen to own any assets in the
state. Id. at 213. Indeed, in Shaffer, the plaintiff was unable to acquire jurisdiction over
seven corporate fiduciaries named in the complaint because they did not own any property
in Delaware. Id. at 192 n.8. In the majority's view, if the Delaware legislature had felt
that it had an overriding interest in overseeing the management of domestic corporations,
it would have enacted a statute specifically designed to enforce this interest.
Justice Brennan, dissenting, argued that Delaware's failure to enact a narrowly drawn
statute applicable to corporate fiduciaries was irrelevant to the issue of whether officers
and directors of Delaware corporations had minimum contacts with the state. Id. at 226-27.
He also noted that Delaware may have failed to enact a narrowly drawn statute for the
very simple reason that the sequestration statute had provided an adequate means of
asserting the state's interest in the past. Id. at 227 n.5.
125. Id. at 215.
126. Id.
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the controversy. 12 7 Quoting from Hanson, in which choice of law factors
were also rejected as jurisdictional criteria, 1 28 the Court reiterated that
the state could not assert adjudicatory authority simply on the grounds that
it was the "center of gravity" of the litigation."2 9 The question of jurisdiction
was to be resolved by examining the acts of the defendants. "1 0
In short, a minimum contact required a connection between the defendant
and the forum state; it was not merely a conclusory term for indicating that
jurisdiction would be fair given the relationship between the litigation and
the forum. The defendant's relationship with the forum state would be
evaluated in terms of purposive acts by which he availed himself "of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum state.' 3 1 Such conduct
apparently did not need to take place physically in the state, although in
Shaffer the Court once again used language reminiscent of Pennoyer to imply
that had the defendants "set foot in Delaware" or had any acts "taken place
3
in Delaware," jurisdiction might have been more easily sustained.

2

Ulti-

mately, the notion of a purposive act fulfilling the minimum contact test
involved some sort of deliberate conduct by which the defendant could
reasonably have expected to submit to suit in the forum state. 133 In the view
of the Court majority, the defendants in Shaffer had "no reason to expect to
be haled before a Delaware court," and jurisdiction could therefore not be
sustained without violating the due process clause.13 4 Thus while the Court
127. E.g., Traynor, supra note 83, arguing that choice of law problems can be avoided
in many instances by susaining jurisdiction of the forum whose law will govern the case.
Courts applying their own law will be more adept to interpreting and applying it and
will also be more interested in promoting its underlying policies. Id. at 664. Justice Brennan
echoed these views in his dissent in Shaffer. He noted that factors relevant to the fairness
of applying a state's law would also be relevant to the fairness of allowing the courts of
that state to take jurisdiction. 433 U.S. at 224-25.
128. 357 U.S. at 253.
129. 433 U.S. at 215, quoting from Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. at 254.
130. 433 U.S. at 215.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 213. The dissent reminded the majority that even if the defendants had
never been physically present in Delaware this fact would not be controlling because
jurisdiction can be asserted on the basis of acts performed outside the state which have
foreseable impact inside the state. Id. at 226.
133. Justice Stevens, concurring, stated that under the due process clause, the defendant
should have "fair warning" that his acts might subject him to the jurisdiction of another
state. Id. at 217-18. Cf. Gray v. American Raditor & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432,
176 N.E.2d 761 (1961) jurisdiction over out-of-state manufacturer upheld in products
liability case on ground that manufacturer contemplated the use of his products in the
forum state).
134. Id. at 216. The majority noted that Delaware had failed to enact a statute making
acceptance of a corporate directorship the equivalent of consent to jurisdiction and that
it did not require directors of Delaware corporations to own stock in the corporation. Id.
In the view of the dissent, this aspect of the majority's holding was purely an advisory
opinion. Justice Brennan argued that the case should have been remanded to allow the
Delaware courts an opportunity to interpret the sequestration statute narrowly as permitting
jurisdiction only when minimum contacts were present. Id. at 220-21. Moreover, he felt
the record was insufficient for determining the existence of contacts because the pro-
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stated in Shaffer that the "relationship among the defendant, the forum, and
the litigation" was the central concern under the jurisdictional principles
set forth in InternationalShoe, 13 the Court's application of minimum contacts analysis to the facts of the case indicates that the controlling factor
is the existence of a purposive connection between the defendant and the
forum state that gives rise to reasonable foreseeability of suit.
In light of this standard rather than an overall fairness test, the validity
of quasi in rem jurisdiction based on attachment of liability insurance is
questionable. One of the major justifications of a Seider proceeding has
been in terms of the nexus between the state and the litigation. The interpretation by the Simpson and Minichiello courts of jurisdictional attachment of liability insurance as a judicially created direct action procedure
rested on the interest of the state in providing injured residents with a
forum.13 6 However, as the dissenting opinions in these two cases observed,
this interest might be outweighed by competing interests of other states. 37
While efforts to justify a Seider proceeding as a direct action have relied
heavily on case law sustaining the constitutionality of Louisiana's direct
action statute, 3s this statute is distinguishable because it provides a forum
for accidents that occur in the state. 39 If the plaintiff receives medical treatment in the state of the accident, that state rather than the state of his
residence will have an interest in insuring that medical creditors are paid
and in preventing the plaintiff from becoming dependent on public assistance.14 0 Moreover, the state of the accident will have an interest in deterring
ceedings below had focused almost exclusively on the question of procedural due process.
Id. at 221. See note 90 supra.
However, since the majority had chosen to rule on the minimum contacts question,
Justice Brennan stated his disagreement with its conclusion. In his view, Delaware had a
strong interest in providing a forum to enforce its regulatory policies vis-a-vis corporations chartered in the state. Id. at 222-23. Moreover, he felt it simply was not true that
the defendants had no expectation of suit in the state, arguing that the defendants voluntarily accepted their positions as fiduciaries of Delaware corporations and that they had
accepted the benefits made available to such persons under Delaware law (e.g., the right
to indemnification). In his view, the lack of an implied consent statute was irrelevant, since
such statutes were merely a fictional offshoot of the Pennoyer framework. Id. at 227-28.
One commentator has termed the majority's analysis of minimum, contacts "muddled,"
arguing that it would not be unreasonable to expect corporate fiduciaries to. anticipate
litigation in the state in which their corporation is chartered. Leathers, Substantive Due
Process Controls of Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction,66 Ky. L.J. 1, 20 (1978). For similar criticism

of the majority's reasoning, see Casad, Shaffer v. Heitner: An End to Ambivalence in
Jurisdiction Theory?, 26 U. KAN. L. Rav. 61 (1977); Comment, The Expanded Scope of
the Sufficient Minimum Contacts Standard: Shaffer v. Heitner, 63 IowA L. Rav. 504 (1977).
135. 433 U.S.,at 204.
136. See text accompanying notes 59-67 supra.
137. 21 N.Y.2d at 318-19, 234 N.E.2d at 676-77, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 643-44; 410 F.2d at 113-15.
138. Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954). In Watson, the
plaintiff was injured in Louisiana by a home permanent kit manufactured by an Illinois
corporation. The Court authorized a direct, action against* the corporation's insurer, even
though the insurance contract had been executed in Massachusetts and contained a clause
excepting direct actions.
139. 21 N.Y.2d at 318. 234 N.E.2d at 676, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 643; 410 F.2d at 114-15.
140. 410 F.2d at 114-15.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol30/iss5/5

24

Kelso:
Jurisdictional
Attachment
Liability Insurance in
Light
of Chan
LAWofREVIEW
OF FLORIDA
UNIVERSITY
[Vol.
XXX
similar tortious conduct and will generally be the more convenient forum
for trial given the availability of witnesses, records, and physical evidence.1 4'
Thus litigational factors and state interests do not necessarily favor the forum
that is seeking to assert jurisdiction. If in Shaffer the substantive state interests
which made Delaware the center of gravity were insufficient to sustain jurisdiction, 1 42 there would be even less ground for jurisdiction in a quasi in ren
action based on liability insurance since many of the relevant interests lie
elsewhere.
Moreover, under the criteria applied in Shaffer, regardless of the location
of the center of gravity, the controlling factor is the existence of a purposive
relationship between the defendant and the forum state.143 If the insurer
is regarded as the real party in interest, as a federal district court has recently
held, the requisite nexus arguably would be met.14 4 The defendant would
have contacts with the forum state, assuming that it does business in the
state, and it would have the expectation of litigation in the forum because
of its promise to defend the insured wherever suit is brought. However,
the fact remains that the insured is still a party to the suit. His interests
cannot be ignored by analogizing a Seider proceeding to a direct action in
which the insured is bypassed altogether. The defendant can be adversely
affected if his insurance premiums are raised as a result of an unfavorable
judgment. -5 Moreover, he could suffer out-of-pocket loss if the judgment
is for the face value of the policy and a subsequent suit is brought in the
state of his residence. 146 Viewed in terms of the foreseeability test applied
by the Court in Shaffer, the defendant should not be exposed to these
consequences unless he had expectation of suit out-of-state.
It is questionable whether drivers ought to anticipate litigation in a
distant jurisdiction on account of the operation of a motor vehicle in their
own state. 47 It has been suggested that if the plaintiff chooses to go out of
141. Id. at 118.
142. See text accompanying notes 120-30 supra.
,143. See text accompanying notes 130-41 supra.
144. O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 437 F. Supp. 994 (E.D. N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 579
F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1978).
145. Comment, supra note 44, at 566.
146. Cf. the direct action statute proposed by one commentator to replace a Seider
proceeding. Rosenberg, One Procedural Genie Too Many or Putting Seider Back into its
Bottle, 71 CoLUM. L. REv. 660, 667 (197,1) (holding that if the plaintiff won a judgment
against the insurer he could not proceed against the defendant in a subsequent action).
But see O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194, 199 n.5 (2d Cir. 1978) (arguing
that potential liability beyond the face amount of the policy has not served to invalidate
direct actions).
Courts have suggested that in situations involving the potential for subsequent litigation,
Seider actions cannot be used as a means of depriving other plaintiffs of their share of
the insurance proceeds. If the defendant did not have any funds of his own, other
potential plaintiffs would be deprived of a remedy. E.g., Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410
F.2d at 119; Rodriguez v. Wolfe, 93 Misc. 2d 364, 401 N.Y.S.2d 442, 444-45 (Supp. Ct. 1978).
147. Cf. Robitaille v. Orciuch, 382 F. Supp. 977 (D.N.H. 1974) (holding that homeowner's insurance could not serve as basis of quasi in rem jurisdiction over nonresident
defendant because insurer did not assume the risk of out-of-state litigation).
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state and encounters a defendant whose activities are purely local in scope,
1 4
the plaintiff can reasonably be expected to litigate in the defendant's forum. 8
While the balance tilts in the plaintiff's favor if the accident occurs when
both parties are engaged in interstate travel, nonetheless, in terms of reasonable expectations the defendant invokes the protection of state law and
assumes the risk of suit only in the state of the accident. In short, as long
as the InternationalShoe test of fair play continues to be expressed in terms
of a minimum contacts standard under which the defendant must undertake
purposive acts foreseeably linking himself with the forum, jurisdiction probably cannot be sustained in a Seider proceeding. Under the standards articulated in Shaffer, if contacts are insufficient to sustain in personam jurisdiction,
49
they are likewise insufficient to sustain quasi in rem jurisdiction.1
Nonetheless, limitation of liability to the face amount of the policy may
make a quasi in rem proceeding reasonable when lack of contacts with the
forum state would make an in personam proceeding unreasonable. 50 The
Shaffer Court's statement that the fairness of asserting jurisdiction should
not depend on the size of the claim would preclude this justification.' 5'
As the Court implied, limitation of liability to the value of the property
would carry little meaning when a large amount of property is involved. 52
In addition, a Seider proceeding resembles an in personam proceeding in
result if the amount of the policy is large enough to cover the damages. 53
Moreover, a deprivation of property without due process remains a constitutional violation regardless of the property's value. -54
CONCLUSION

Thus, neither the defendant's contacts with the forum state nor the
limited amount of the judgment favor the constitutionality of a quasi in rem
action based on attachment of liability insurance. Accordingly, post-ShafferSeider proceedings presents yet another issue in connection with the new
standards for jurisdiction: the fictipnal nature of the attachment process. 155
Since the presence of intangibles is a fiction and the same minimum contacts
test is now to be applied to quasi in rem as well as in personam jurisdiction,
the purpose for preserving quasi in rem jurisdiction is dubious. Yet in
applying the Shaffer test, lower courts ruling on Seider attachments have

148. von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 83, at 1167.
149. See 433 U.S. at 212.
150. E.g., Rintala v. Shoemaker, 362 F. Supp. 1044, 1054-55

(D. Minn. 1973).

151. 433 U.S. at 207 n.23.
152. In Shaffer, the Court noted that potential liability was over one million dollars.
Id. at 209 n.32.
153. 16 BuSrALo L. REv. 769, 775-76 (1967). If the policy covers the damages, the
plaintiff's recovery will be the same as if he had proceeded in personam. Moreover, an
individual with very low insurance coverage is likely to be judgment proof. Id. at 776 n.62.
154. Cf. Fuentes v. Shevin. 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (due process applies to all forms of
property, not just to basic necessities).
155. See notes 55-56 supra and accompanying text.
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to determine
looked first for the presence of property and then have sought
15 6
whether there are sufficient contacts to justify jurisdiction.
Shaffer itself is ambiguous as to whether quasi in rem jurisdiction should
be retained. On the one hand, it speaks of "assessing assertions of jurisdiction
by a single standard' 57 and notes that while the defendant's property may
provide contacts among the defendant, the litigation, and the forum state,
the property itself does not form the basis of jurisdiction. 58 On the other
hand, the Court, while not expressly abolishing quasi in rem jurisdiction,
speaks of applying International Shoe standards to both quasi in rem and
in personam jurisdiction. 159
One of the main arguments for the preservation of quasi in rem jurisdiction has been the notion that limited liability makes the assertion of

156. E.g., Wallace v. Target Store, Inc., 92 Misc. 2d 454, 400 N.Y.S.2d 478 (Sup. Ct.
1977); Katz v. Umansky, 92 Misc. 2d 285, 399 N.Y.S.2d 412 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (finding that
presence of property without other ties between defendant, state, and litigation is not
sufficient for jurisdiction).
157. 433 U.S. at 209.
158. Id. at 209 n.31.
159. Id. at 207.
It has been pointed out that the appellant's challenge to the Delaware sequestration
statute addressed only the application of the statute. Id. at 189. The majority apparently
did not hold the statute unconstitutional on its face, but rather, held that Delaware's
assertion of jurisdiction in this case did not comport with due process. T. Sullivan, Civil
Procedure: State Court Jurisdiction -Putting the Shoe on the Other Foot 6 (November
21, 1977) (unpublished case comment written for University of Florida Law Review).
In separate concurring opinions, both Justice Powell and Justice Stevens stated that
the majority opinion should not be read as abolishing classic in rein actions involving
property, such as real estate, with fixed situs. Such property would provide the necessary
nexus within the International Shoe standard and could be used as a shorthand test for
jurisdiction without having to apply the minimum contacts standard. 433 U.S. at 217-19.
To compound the confusion, Justice Stevens stated in his concurrence that he agreed
with the majority that the sequestration statute was unconstitutional on its face, and
Justice Brennan stated in his dissent that the majority had found the statute "invalid."
Id. at 220.
Some commentators have contended that Shaffer establishes a unitary theory of jurisdiction and that the distinctions between quasi in rem and in personam jurisdiction will
disappear. 9 TEX. TECH. L. Ri.nv. 126, 139 n.75 (1977); Comment, The Reasonableness
Standard in State-Court Jurisdiction: Shaffer v. Heitner and the Uniform Minimum Contacts Theory, 14 WAKE FoREsT L. REv. 51, 72 (1978). Others have said that Shaffer does
not abolish quasi in rem jurisdiction. Casad, supra note 134, and Leathers, supra note 134.
Presumably a state could continue to assert quasi in rem jurisdiction if it wished, since
the Supreme Court has held that a state is not compelled to exercise jurisdiction to the
limits permitted by the due process clause. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342
U.S. 437, 440 (1952) (assertion of in personam jurisdiction over a foreign corporation neither
constitutionally prohibited nor constitutionally mandated; Court remanded the case to
Ohio state courts for determination as to whether the state would take jurisdiction). See
Leathers, supra note 134, at 24-26, suggesting that when a state provides for only limited
in personam jurisdiction, quasi in rem statutes can be utilized as a form of long-arm jurisdiction. However, one wonders why a state would want to continue to exercise quasi in rem
jurisdiction when to do so it would need to meet the same minimum contacts test applicable to in personam jurisdiction.
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jurisdiction fair. 60 As noted above, the Court apparently rejected this argument.' 6' Moreover, if this rationale were accepted, it would involve the
creation of a two-tier minimum contacts test: certain contacts would be suffident for quasi in rem jurisdiction while additional contacts would be needed
for full in personam jurisdiction. As a practical matter, such a bifurcated
standard would prove difficult to apply. 62 Furthermore, it has been argued
that because quasi in rem jurisdiction provides a simplified test, it diminishes
the necessity for lengthy case by case litigation as to what constitutes a
minimum contact. 63 However, quasi in rem jurisdiction has generated its
own share of litigation i64 Additionally, the Court in Shaffer recognized that
simplicity of litigation cannot be achieved at the expense of due process. 1 5
Quasi in rem jurisdiction seems most viable when no other forum exists. 16
Indeed, the Court in Shaffer declined to consider whether the presence of
property would be a proper basis of jurisdiction in the absence of any other
forum. 67 Yet even in this instance, suit could be maintained on the basis
of jurisdiction by necessity rather than on resort to the intermediate step
of determining presence of property. 6 Similarly, classic in rem cases could
be maintained under the long-arm statutes, many of which provide for
in personam jurisdiction for actions growing out of the defendant's ownership
of real property within the state. 69 In short, if the minimum contacts standard
is to apply to both quasi in rem and in personam jurisdiction, there is little
reason to preserve the dual categories. The use of the presence of property
notion, as a fulcrum in assessing the existence of minimum contacts, partic160. Smit, The Enduring Utility of in Rem Rules: A Lasting Legacy of Pennoyer v.
Neff, 43 BROoKLYN L. REv. 600, 627-29 (1977).

161. See notes 150-54 supra and accompanying text.
162. Cf. Buckley v. New York Post Corp., 573 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1967) (rejecting as
too vague the application of First Amendment considerations to require a higher standard
of minimum contacts for defamation actions brought under long-arm statutes). Contra,
New York Times Co. v. Connor, 365 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1966). See Carrington & Martin,
Substantive Interests and the Jurisdiction of State Courts, 66 Mica. L. REV. 227

(1967)

arguing for a varying quantum of minimum contacts).
163. Smit, supra note 160, at 606-13.
164. E.g., as to the situs of intangibles. Carrington, supra note 83, at 309.
165. 433 U.S. at, 211...
166. SeeMcHugh v. Paley 65 Misc. 2d 1092,_ 314 N.Y.S.2d 208 (Sup. ct. 19701, a
Seider action brought in New York by a Massachusetts plaintiff against a, Bahanian
defendant. The plaintiff acquired in personam jurisdiction over the New York defendant,
but under ordinary circumstances her quasi in rem action against the Bahamian defendant
would have been dismissed because she was not a New York resident. See notes 72-78
supra and accompanying text. However, the court allowed the Seider action to continue
because there was no other forum in which jurisdiction could be obtained over both
defendants. The plaintiff was on welfare and could not afford to go to the Bahamas
to bring suit. Moreover, the Bahamas did not have a contingent fee system or legal aid,
so that the possibility of suit there was foreclosed.
167. 433 U.S. at 211 n.87.
168. On jurisdiction by necessity, see Fraser, Jurisdiction by Necessity-An Analysis of
the Mullane Case, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 305 (1951).
169. E.g., FL.A. STAT. §48.193(c) (1977) (anyone who "[o]wns, uses, or possesses any
real property within this state" submits to personal jurisdiction).
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